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Tanks and armor are not a big deal-the planes are the killers. 1
can handle everything but the jet fighters.l
- TALIBAN COMMANDER, june 2008

When we hear the planes overhead, we feel relief because we
know it is going to be over, and we are probably not going to die
that day. 2
-U.S. ARMY SERGEANT, September 2008

In the twenty-first century, perspective matters. To America's adversaries
in the field, U.S. air capabilities, including those of the U.S. Air Force, are
a terrifying threat, far more intimidating than many other elements of
American power. From the perspective of an American infantryman in
the midst of combat, airpower is a psychological-not only a physicallifesaver.
Yet in the salons of newspapers, think tanks, and academia, and even
among its sister services and other government entities, the air force is the
gang that can't shoot straight. During the same month in which the Taliban
The views and opinions expressed herein are those of the author alone, and not
necessarily those of the Department of Defense or any of its components.
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commander quoted in the epigraph gave his rather strong testimonial about
the effectiveness of airpower, the editors of the Washington Post derided
the air force as "adrift,"3 and those of the New York Times condemned it as
"dysfunctional." Functionality, it seems, is much a matter of perspective+
Notwithstanding success on actual battlefields, the U.S. Air Force finds
itself suffering setbacks in the all-important area of operation that is
Washington. Already battered by allegations of improprieties in awarding
contracts, and beset with difficulties in communicating its purpose and
vision, the service staggered under revelations that nuclear-related materials
had been mishandled. As the incidents were interpreted as failures of
leadership, the air forces secretary and chief of staff were ousted, and other
senior leaders suffered career-ending accountability actions.s
More fundamentally, however, the Air Forces sense of itself is under
siege. As the service that prides itself on its ability to keep the worlds most
dangerous existential threats at bay, it nevertheless is finding that contemporary defense thinking undervalues that ability Indeed, it has never been
more fashionable to discount the need for the kind of firepower the Air
Force best provides and to mock the very suggestion that we are likely to do
battle against another modem army-let alone an air force. Even Secretary
of Defense Robert Gates categorized apprehensions about such possibilities
as "next-war-itis. "6
With few airpower advocates in the Office of the Secretary of Defense,?
it is not surprising that the National Defense Strategy, issued in june
of 2008, perpetuated an approach to national security planning which
heavily emphasizes "irregular war," epitomized by the conflicts in Iraq
and Afghanistan. 8 While acknowledging the notion of hedging against the
emergence of a peer-competitor, the document unmistakably focuses on
conflicts with nonstate actors at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict.
Specifically, it states that "for the foreseeable future, winning the Long
War against violent extremist movements will be the central objective of
the U.S."9
Unless airmen can do a better job of explaining to decision makers
how air, space, and cyberspace power provides potent, full-spectrum capabilities to the joint team, the focus of the National Defense Strategy does
not spell good news for the Air Force.lO In popular imagination, not to mention the minds of key leaders, waging irregular warfare against extremism
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is overwhelmingly the province of the ground forces. Fueling this view are
the heretofore rarely challenged assumptions about Field Manual (FM) 3-24,
the army and Marine Corps counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine issued in
December 2006.11 Specifically, there is a widespread belief that principles
enunciated in FM 3-24 were wholly responsible for suppressing violence
in Iraq.
Of course, as I will go on to show, there is strong empirical data
demonstrating that airpower was, in fact, vital to the joint success in Iraq
beginning in 2007. But that evidence has not penetrated very far into the
public consciousness. The belief that the manual is the sine qua non of
COIN is significant-if not alarming-for the air force, since the doctrine
conceives of only a very limited role for airpower, confining its discussion
largely to a five-page annex. Consequently, many wrongly believe that airpower has little relevance to the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
More disconcerting is that, to the extent airpower is employed to fight
insurgencies, many believe it is actually undermining the supposedly allimportant centerpiece of counterinsurgency, that is, winning "hearts and
minds. "12 In so concluding, they point to reports in the summer of 2008
that air strikes in Afghanistan were responsible for needless civilian deaths.
To their way of thinking, the military can prevent such casualties by restraining the use of airpower in favor of more U.S. ground troops. 13
All of this combines to create an atmosphere so poisoned that some
pundits question the very rationale for having an air force.l4 The irony of
the situation is that more than any other service, the air force has dominated
the physical domains in which it operates. While the ground forces
still struggle in Iraq and Afghanistan to defeat lightly armed insurgents
whom they typically greatly outnumber, the U.S. Air Force has made short
work of every aerial opponent it has faced, including top-of-the-line
Russian-built aircraft in Serbia. For its part, Saddam Husseins air force was
so petrified of facing American pilots that it literally buried its airplanes to
avoid doing so.
The purpose of this essay is to outline several of the sources of the Air
Forces difficulties, discuss some Air Force successes, and offer a few thoughts
for the way ahead. It is uncompromising on one point: if the Air Forces critics succeed in deconstructing the worlds most successful military force, the
security of the United States will be in real jeopardy
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Air Force Culture and Leadership Development

Identifying the underlying cause of the Air Forces problematic state is no
easy task. As would be the case with any large and complicated organization,
there are multiple causes for the services current institutional difficulties.
Still, it is always useful to examine leadership development when an organization is not meeting its own expectations or those of others. This examination suggests that the Air Forces leadership development process and its
institutional culture intertwine in a way that may not be best serving its
interests in the twenty-first century
Let us begin with the current situation: it is indisputable that the Air
Force has relatively few senior officers filling the leadership posts deemed
most influential in national security policymaking.lS Equally troubling is
that the service has few flag officers able to act in the larger defense community as effective spokespersons and advocates for airpower.l6
Likewise, the Air Force has not-as the army has-produced a cadre of
warrior-intellectuals.l7 Rare is the Air Force general who combines front-line
combat experience with a broad-based PhD. In other words, the Air Force
simply does not have combined in a single senior officer the qualities that
have helped to make army general David H. Petraeus so successful and
so widely admired as the prototype of military leadership for the twentyfirst century
The career path of most airmen makes it difficult to mirror the background of a Petraeus. The relatively lengthy training undertaken by aviators
(who form the core of the services senior leadership) leaves little time for the
advanced study required for a PhD. Beyond an initial year of undergraduate
pilot training, officers must continually fly to stay current in the increasingly complex aircraft used by todays Air Force. Over a career, the weeks
and months of training needed to maintain essentially the same flying skills
a company grade officer uses detract from the time available to acquire the
kind of education most important at the senior level.
The result is that few who go on to command major Air Force organizations have a doctorate on their resume. Of course, there are many welleducated officers in the Air Force. More than half have a postgraduate
degree, 18 and most flag officers have at least a masters degree in some
specialty The Air Force does continue to "chum out scores of airmen with
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advanced degrees," as the former secretary of the Air Force recently observed,
but many of the advanced degrees are in science and engineering.l9 Indeed,
a study by Colonel Tom Ruby points out the "relative paucity" of Air Force
senior officers "with doctorates applicable to strategy development."20
The emphasis on the hard sciences colors the outlook of many Air Force
officers on a variety of issues to a point where it much defines the culture of
the service. Although the in-depth knowledge of these officers enables them
to understand the intricacies of the many advanced systems the Air Force
employs, it can put them at a disadvantage in a world in which the skills of
the liberally educated are increasingly valued in leadership positions. Nor
does the assignment process close the gap. One study argues that airmen
do not compete well for major theater commands because they have "a
narrower upbringing and less exposure to the political process than other
service members."2l
Again, Air Force culture plays a role in accentuating this deficiency
Beyond the training demands that keep them in the cockpit, the sheer love
of flying creates a dislike for the developmental staff jobs so essential to the
leadership of twenty-first century militaries. For instance, most experts agree
that effective military strategy must take into account a range of political,
social, moral, and economic matters in addition to those purely military in
nature.22 The narrower upbringing of Air Force officers often does not allow
them to internalize adequately these important disciplines, and leaves them
with a tendency to analyze problems from a scientific and technological
perspective, which can in turn make them less adept at integrating the
other important factors into their thinking.
Air force thinking does devote much intellectual energy to examining
and optimizing the characteristics of its technologies, as well as the mechanics of procuring and maintaining them. However, creatively envisioning
the strategic employment of air, space, and cyberspace power gets markedly
less attention. Put another way, the Air Force is culturally more interested in
encyclopedic knowledge of the specifications of its equipment than in how
to best use that equipment across the spectrum of conflict. That the late Carl
Builder identified virtually the same problem in the early 1990s only serves
to underline how entrenched it is culturally23
For all the technical expertise of airmen, some officers argue that
todays Air Force suffers from anti-intellectualism, that is, from "valuing
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doers over thinkers."24 According to Colonel Ruby, "Technical proficiency
cannot substitute for an ability to analyze issues critically and apply every
asset available to achieve a specific end in differing political and military
contexts."25 This suggests another issue that bedevils the Air Force: the
science and engineering propensities of airmen render them less than fully
sensitive to the human dimension of the art of war making.
This insensitivity can harm the Air Force in unexpected ways. For
example, the Air Forces concept of centralized control and decentralized
execution of airpower has led to an unfortunate assumption by its comrades
in arms, particularly in the army The Air Force relies on advanced communications methodologies that permit the comprehensive command and
control of its capabilities from a single air and space operations center in a
given theater of operations26 Typically, the operations center is physically
separate from the operations center of the overall joint force commander.
Thus senior Air Force commanders were not co-located with the overall
joint force commander in either Iraq or Afghanistan. Theoretical efficiencies
aside, the physical absence of Air Force flag officers from the councils of
war conducted by army and Marine Corps generals in Iraq and Afghanistan
prevented the development of the kind of personal bonds that produce
mutual respect and understanding. Moreover, it seems to have created
suspicion among some ground-component officers that the Air Force lacks
sufficient understanding of or, worse, concern about, their needs.
The failure to fully appreciate the importance of developing these
personal bonds does not bode well for the future. Compared to the army and
the Marine Corps, the Air Force has far fewer officers destined for senior
rank with extended service in either Iraq or Afghanistan. Many top Air
Force officers who have served in the Middle East did so at the site of the
air operations center or at another airbase located outside of those countries.
As a practical matter, as Iraq and Afghanistan veterans assume higher leadership positions in the army and Marine Corps, this divergence in experience may create further difficulties for the Air Force in its relationship with
the ground forces.
Likewise, it may be hard to place Air Force officers, however otherwise
talented, in positions of prominence either in joint commands or in key
positions in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Understandably, those
with service in Iraq or Afghanistan will likely be favored since they will
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presumably be more cognizant of the nuances of contemporary conflicts.
This will result in combatant commands responsible for the areas of probable conflict dominated by officers not in the Air Force. Because of the
extraordinary-and growing-authority of these four-star joint commands,
the absence of airmen from the upper ranks of the most important ones is
worrisome for those who believe that the air weapon has an irreplaceable
role to play in protecting the nations interests.
Today, there is a growing tendency for combatant commanders, emboldened by supportive Defense Department polices, to attempt to expand their
authority at the expense of individual services. Consider, for example, the
effort by Marine Corps general james N. Mattis, the commander of joint
Forces Command, to expunge the concept of effects-based operations (EBO)
even though it is fundamental to Air Force doctrine.27 There are many
arguments for and against EBO, but suffice it to say that at its core, EBO
focuses on achieving certain effects desired by the commander without
particular concern for which service or platform accomplishes the necessary tasks. 28
To be sure, it is possible that the Marines could consider EBO a threat to
their air-ground task force approach.29 For example, the implementation of
EBO might require making all aviation assets available for theater-wide
tasking based upon the joint force commanders highest priorities-that is,
airpower would not be reserved for use at the corps' discretion. In that case,
the Marines could see EBO as disrupting the air-ground synergy that they
believe their style of warfare requires, and hence as undermining the combat
power of Marine formations to the detriment of the overall effort.
Regardless, for a combatant commander to use his joint authority to
attempt to demolish another services operational approach is, to say the least,
unprecedented. Retired Air Force lieutenant general Thomas Mcinerney
termed General Mattiss memo "parochial, un-joint, biased, one-sided," and
pointed out further that EBO had been "key in the transformation of warfare-and proven in the most successful U.S. military conflicts of the past
20 years (Desert Storm and Allied Force)."30 Yet such bureaucratic eviscerations of Air Force doctrine are what happen when too few airmen occupy key
joint billets, and-importantly-when the service is perceived as vulnerable.
Additionally, the Air Forces "engineering" mind-set tends to generate a
rather naive belief that the efficacy of its capabilities are self-evident. Many
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airmen seem to assume that decision makers will readily engage in a dispassionate, almost mathematical analysis of available data, which will irrefutably
demonstrate the utility and value of airpower and the Air Force. In such a
conception of the world, advocacy per se is wholly unnecessary and, indeed,
a bit unseemly In the real world, of course, advocating particular policies or
arguing for alternatives requires a far more aggressive approach than merely
computing numbers and presenting spreadsheets. The numbers do not, necessarily, speak for themselves.
All of this is in stark contrast to what the other services have mastered.
The armys development of FM 3-24 is a classic example of savvy twentyfirst-century policymaking. During the developmental stage of the doctrine,
the army invited comment from a range of representatives from outside
the military, including the media, academia, and think tanks_3l The army
drafters of the manual gave the inputs from these unconventional sources
more than just a respectful hearing; in many instances their suggestions were
wholly adopted.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the final document was praised for
the very characteristics so admired by some civilian intellectuals and
academics-notwithstanding the opaqueness of these characteristics in
terms of military doctrine.32 As one commentator explained, FM 3-24
was popular
among sections of the countrys liberal-minded intelligentsia.
This was warfare for northeastern graduate students--complex,
blended with politics, designed to build countries rather than
destroy them, and fashioned to minimize violence. It was a
doctrine with particular appeal to people who would never own
a gun_33
What this process did, in effect, was to disarm potential adversaries-those
ordinarily likely to oppose almost anything coming out of the armed
forces-by giving them intellectual ownership of the doctrine produced.
This generated an outpouring of flattery from a myriad of unusual venues,
including an almost obsequious review in the New York Times Book Review)4
Much of what the manual was understood to advocate was not, in
fact, what proved successful in Iraq during the period of its supposed
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implementation in 2007 and 2008;35 but its public perception as calling for
a "kinder and gentler" form of war making with little use for airpower
remains firmly in place. At least insofar as FM 3-24s reputation for passivity
is concerned, it seems to be more a product of the wishful thinking of some
of the manuals fans than the machinations of its drafters. General Petraeus,
one of the manuals principal authors, insists that it does not "shy away from
the need to kill the enemy" and that "the words 'kill' and 'capture' are on
every page."36
Nevertheless, respected trade publications such as Defense News were
claiming as late as September of 2008 that the "Army and Marines are
succeeding in Iraq, thanks to a softer approach."37 Regardless of what the
manual does or does not say, the much-derided techniques of "killing
and capturing" both spiked during this most successful period of the Iraq
War, and-importantly-airpower became key to that effort as air strikes
increased fivefold in 2007.38 Retired Air Force lieutenant general Michael
Dunn, the president of the Air Force Association, characterized the counterinsurgency effort in this way in july of 2008:
The so-called troop surge has really been an airpower surge.
Consider this. Air sorties are up 85%; air strikes are up 400%;
weight of ordnance dropped is up 1000%. Some insiders say that
90% of the terrorists being killed are being killed by airpower.39
Notwithstanding the enormous role airpower played (and continues
to play) in counterinsurgency operations, the Washington Post accurately
observes that the "public faces of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have been
almost exclusively those of troops in Army and Marine Corps uniforms. "40
Thus, the army, despite years of botched strategies (as recorded in such
books as Tom Rickss Fiasco4l), has been able to reinvent its "brand" to be
that of an intellectual, forward-thinking institution.
To meet its larger manpower recruiting need and facilitate this transformational rebranding, the army enjoys a significantly larger advertising budget than that of the Air Force. Beyond its paltry marketing budget, the
Air Force has been burdened with its problematic "Above All" advertising
campaign, which viewers have found alternatively inscrutable and arrogant.42 While all service advertising efforts seek to appeal to recruits by
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projecting a sense of organizational uniqueness and excellence, the Air
Forces slogan turned out to be self-defeating. It is almost (but not quite)
understandable that the Air Force frequently has found itself denounced as
an organization wedded to outdated Cold War concepts.43
The army (and the Marine Corps) have also benefited from scores of
books, articles, and broadcasts that-whatever their view of the leadership-treated the individual soldier or marine with great sympathy The reason is easy to discern: those who produced the most favorable commentary
usually had been embedded with ground units. The army's own study of the
Iraq war, On Point II, recognizes the effect this had by quoting Los Angeles
Times reporter john Hendren:
When you're living in tents with these guys and eating what they
eat and cleaning the dirt off the glasses, its a whole different experience. You definitely have a concern about knowing people so
well that you sympathize with them.44

On Point II downplays the phenomenon by insisting rather illogically that the
reporting of embedded journalists was not biased, even though the authors
came to "understand the Soldiers with whom they lived and who protected
them from danger."45 In truth, there is little doubt that the association with
the vibrant personalities of Americas young soldiers and marines who were
protecting them from very real threats was influential, and this "understanding" boosted the ground services' image overall.
The Air Force has little hope of engendering favorable press the same
way The nature of the services operations is such that it does not lend itself
to the embedding of reporters. Embeds rarely find themselves in the cockpit
of an airplane46 or, for that matter, in the confines of an unmanned aerial
system (UAS) or satellite. It is quite rare for an airman to have a humaninterest story related to Air Force capabilities that is as captivating as that of
his infantry counterpart fighting amid the sights, sounds, and smells of
ground combat.
Regrettably, to the extent there are human-interest stories about airpower
coming out of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, they are typically negative
ones, emphasizing the tragedy of civilian deaths. Air Force "stories" tend to
revolve around technology rather than people. Given the relative paucity of
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authors with the interest and background to write animatedly about the
technology that underpins the Air Force way of war, the service~ difficulties
in explaining itself are not hard to understand.
In certain respects, the Air Force has been its own worst enemy
Beginning with the distribution of videos of precision bombs falling into airshafts during the first Gulf War, the service has created the perception that
what it does is easy In every conflict for more than half a century, the Air
Force has provided near-perfect air defense as well as long-range strikes and
theater and strategic lift; as a result, the service garners little thought or consideration by its beneficiaries. The U.S. national defense community cavalierly considers these resources as givens, though of course virtually no other
air force in the world can provide these capabilities.
The situation is even more aggravated with respect to costly and intricate
space systems. Here, too, Air Force capabilities are taken for granted. The
Secretary of the Air Force recently noted that in the Middle East, "U.S. and
Coalition forces are supported by over 46 satellites, along with their network
of operations centers and ground stations, operated by airmen at bases
across the globe."47 Yet the Air Force~ sister services seem at best to recognize only vaguely that these are Air Force-furnished resources.
Beyond being taken for granted, the Air Force also must deal with the
perception that its high-tech weaponry is easier to control than is really
the case. Consider this statement by a former member of the National
Security Council:
Air power is more susceptible to legal and policy adjustment than
ground combat, in light of the variations in means and method
of attack available through variation in munitions, delivery
azimuth, angle of attack, aim point, fuse, and explosive, all
amplified with the assistance of computer simulation.48
This type of overstatement, which implies that Air Force weaponry is perfectly controllable, exacerbates criticism when things seem to go awry There
is little appreciation for the vagaries of combat; the assumption is that any
unintended result is due to malfeasance.
The air force has not effectively conveyed the vulnerability of the
current force or, equally important, the fragility of the supporting industrial
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base. Although key decision makers seem cognizant of the services aging
fleet, they evidently believe the looming deficiencies do not merit immediate attention. Accordingly, decisions concerning the production of the
F-22 fighter and the acquisition of a new tanker were left to the new
administration. 49
Even respected experts like Professor Richard K. Betts of Columbia
University appear to misapprehend the lead time required to manufacture
and field air, space, and cyberspace technology Betts argues that hedging
against a peer-competitor threat like China merely requires a "mobilization
strategy"50 By this he means putting off the production of weaponry "until
genuine evidence" exists that military supremacy is slipping.sl But waiting
until the threat actually exists is often waiting too long to produce successful counters. Consider how long it took to field the relatively low-tech Mine
Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles. 52
Apparently, Professor Betts-and presumably other national security
experts-are unaware that once the production line for a high-tech weapon
like an advanced aircraft terminates, it may take years to regenerate it.
There is no "mobilization strategy" that is meaningful for a service that
depends upon superior technology for its military effectiveness. Once a
threat is actually materializing, it is most likely too late to address it by the
manufacture of new equipment. To paraphrase an erstwhile defense leader,
"you go to war with the air force you have; not the one you want."

An Airpower Renaissance?

Do all of these issues mean the Air Force is doomed to be underappreciated
and underresourced, and hence undervalued as an instrument of national
power? Actually, no. Despite its many ills, airpower-if not the Air Force
itself-is enjoying a renaissance of sorts. Rather surprisingly, this is nowhere
more evident than in counterinsurgency operations.
The details of the revolutionary changes that have made airpower
such a capability of choice in counterinsurgency operations are available elsewhere. Suffice it to say here that airpower "persistence and precision" technologies-many of which have been only recently fieldedhave led influential strategists to insist that the nature of warfare has
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fundamentally changed. In the fall of 2007, retired army general Barry
McCaffrey observed:
We have already made a 100 year war-fighting leap-ahead
with MQ-1 Predator, MQ-9 Reaper, and Global Hawk. Now
we have loiter times in excess of 24 hours, persistent eyes on
target, micro-kill with Hellfire and 500 lb JDAM bombs,
synthetic aperture radar, and a host of ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] sensors and communications
potential that have fundamentally changed the nature of
warfare. 53
In essence, profound advances in the ability to conduct persistent and precise ISR, complemented by the availability of precise strikes, have combined
to create a new way of war, one that is increasingly problematic for low-tech
insurgents to counter. Perhaps even more importantly, these new high-tech
capabilities make it possible for airpower to have a strategic effect not on
civilian morale, as airpower pioneers once sought, but on the minds of the
actual combatants. 54
As the first of the epigraphs to this chapter suggests, today airpower
can inflict on insurgents a sense of helplessness that is psychologically debilitating. Commanders seem to understand this development. According to
counterinsurgency expert Colin Kahl, air strikes in Iraq increased dramatically in 2007 partly because of the realization of their ability to affect the
enemy$ psychology 55 In fact, hints about the psychological effect of precision aerial fires had appeared even earlier. General Tommy Franks relates
that during his tenure in command, an Afghan ally told him that the
AC-130 gunship is "a famous airplane [whose] guns have destroyed the
spirit of the Taliban and the Arabs."56
The psychological unhinging of today$ insurgents by contemporary
airpower is apparent in more than just the battlespaces of Iraq and
Afghanistan. The Revolutionary Armed Force of Colombia (FARC, in its
Spanish acronym), the main insurgent group in Colombia, is being devastated by desertions which, according to interviews with former rebels,
are much motivated by "the sheer terror of being bombed by Colombian
fighter planes." 57

...
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In American counterinsurgency operations, the phenomenal growth of
robotic aeronautical platforms makes it possible to achieve almost Pavlovian
psychological reactions. As one report put it:
Iraqi insurgents have learned to fear the drones. 'They hear
some sort of air noise and they don't know exactly what it is,
but they know it's associated with 'my buddy getting killed,"' says
[a U.S. soldier].S8
The sheer inability to defend against airpower no doubt contributes to
its devastating psychological effect, as insurgents have few weapons capable
of holding high-performance aircraft at risk.59 In fact, the greatest threat
to airpower in counterinsurgency operations is not a weapon at all, but
rather misperceptions about its relationship to civilian casualties, especially
in Afghanistan.

The Civilian Casualty Conundrum

It is, of course, true that aerial fires-like ground-based fires-can cause civilian causalities. 60 However, there is no question that Taliban and al Qaeda are
stepping up their sophisticated effort to turn every tragedy into a political
issue.6 1 Unfortunately, they are enjoying significant success. According to the
chief NATO spokesman, the coalition "is definitely not winning the information war."62 Part of the problem is clearly bureaucratic. As the Washington Post
explains: "Although civilian deaths have been frequent and real, officials say
that the Taliban quickly broadcasts exaggerated tolls, stoking public anger,
while foreign military officers may take days to respond. "63
There is a real risk that the Taliban may succeed in pressuring coalition
forces to virtually abandon airpower. Misinformation is playing a role.
Friendly forces do not seem to understand that it is not wise to declare that
every civilian death, however tragic, is the product of an error. Too often,
however, they seem to do just that. For example, the commander of NATOs
International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan recently insisted that
"any civilian casualty caused by NATO or American forces is inadvertent."6 4
This statement, together with earlier NATO statements suggesting that no
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bombing would take place if it were known that civilians were in the area,
can create serious military difficulties. 55
International law prohibits targeting civilians, but it does not ban attacks
on legitimate targets even if it is known that innocents will be killed as
a result. Rather, the law requires only that such losses not be "excessive"
in relation to the military advantage sought. 66 If the law were otherwise,
it would simply encourage adversaries to use innocent civilians as
human shields.67
Of course, every effort must be made to limit civilian losses, but the
requisite analysis ought to take into account those civilians who may be
killed by Taliban and al Qaeda if these groups are allowed to escape an airstrike.
Limiting civilian casualties requires as careful an assessment of the consequences of not bombing as of the bombing itself. When civilian deaths occur
in the course of an otherwise legitimate attack because the enemy is wrongly
intermingling with civilians, the legal and moral responsibility for the deaths
is upon the insurgents, not the attackers. Counterinsurgency forces would
do well to make that clear to decision makers and the public.
Somewhat surprisingly, there seems to be a rather widespread belief
that more ground-force counterinsurgents will somehow reduce the number
of civilian casualties. The evidence indicates otherwise. The air strikes that
have recently caused the most civilian casualties were typically not preplanned in the air operations center, but were the product of actions taken
at the behest of U.S. forces on the ground.68 Such strikes can lack the
detailed vetting that otherwise takes place in the operations center targeting cell. As one journalist observes, such planning may include extended
aerial surveillance that provides those in the operations center with "a better
vantage point than an Army unit has just down the street from a group
of insurgents."69
When airpower is applied as the result of this kind of preplanning,
even Human Rights Watch activist Marc Garlasoc concedes that "airstrikes
probably are the most discriminating weapon that exists."70 However, when
they are called for by troops on the ground, "not all air strikes can be so
meticulously planned." This is the view of General James Conway, commandant of the Marines, who points out that "U.S. or allied units can call in
sudden strikes when they find themselves in a firefight or stumble on a
meeting of Taliban leaders." He also makes clear how insurgents exploit
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the imprecision of these unplanned attacks: "Sometimes its a conscious
tactic of these people who meet to make sure there are kids playing in
the compound so that they're seen, and that complicates your targeting
methodology. ... This is a dirty game being played."7l
In any event, troops on the ground do not necessarily equate to more
discriminate targeting. journalist Mark Thompson-a frequent critic of
airpower-admitted after a ground force raid that reportedly left as many as
fifteen civilians dead that "having American soldiers in a position to call in
strikes is no guarantee that civilians won't be killed. "72
More troops on the ground mean more risk against which the air
weapon may be the sole defensive recourse. This is especially so in
Afghanistan, where the mountainous terrain leaves few other options for
isolated garrisons undergoing unanticipated attacks that threaten to overrun them. The desire to attack without the threat of retaliation by air may
well be a principal motivation for the Taliban's propaganda efforts to delegitimize airpower. 73

Airpower and COIN

Although it is unquestionably true that military means cannot alone achieve all
the goals of a counterinsurgency effort, it is also accurate to say that in terms
of suppressing violence, the strategy of "killing and capturing," as noted above,
has proven more effective than expected. This strategy was presumed to rely
on deployment of massive numbers of U.S. ground forces as counterinsurgents. FM 3-24, for example, calls for a "minimum troop density" of twenty
counterinsurgents per thousand residents;74 it was such calculations that led
to the "surge" of nearly thirty thousand American troops into Iraq in 2007.
However, recent reports call into question the "more boots on the
ground" theory Specifically, journalist Bob Woodward, author of the
The War Within (about the surge phase of the Iraq War), insists that "at least
three other factors were as important as, or even more important than, the
surge" including operations that "locate, target and kill key individuals" in
various insurgent groups_75
This is a very significant truth for developing counterinsurgency strategy for the United States because it is becoming increasingly clear that
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deploying masses of American troops will always be problematic in irregular
warfare situations, and especially so in the Middle East. Studies demonstrate
that the presence of foreign forces nearly always invigorates an insurgency
The "fundamental motivation" for insurgencies generally, expert William R.
Polk maintains, is "to protect the integrity of the native group from foreigners."76 This is especially so in Iraq.77
Thus the desirability of airpower, which does not require a large "footprint" in a nation suffering from an insurgency, and perhaps requires none at
all. This is not an especially new feature of the air weapon. What is new is
the capacity to "target and kill" specific individuals, the exact capability
Woodward says was so important in suppressing violence in Iraq. Consider
this report from journalist Mark Benjamin:
The Air Force recently watched one man in Iraq for more
than five weeks, carefully recording his habits-where he lives,
works and worships, and whom he meets. . . . The military
may decide to have such a man arrested, or to do nothing at
all. Or, at any moment they could decide to blow him
to smithereensJS
Similarly, the Los Angeles Times reported in April of 2008 that NATO forces
in Afghanistan "recently have had unusual success in tracking and targeting
mid-level Taliban field commanders, killing scores of them in pinpoint
airstrikes. "79 Cases like this suggest that neutralizing individual insurgents is
much more important to overall counterinsurgency success than FM 3-24
and other approaches would indicate.
The need for a counterinsurgency strategy that does not require
large numbers of U.S. ground forces is very great. According to james S.
Corum, the loss of blood and treasure in Iraq has so eroded domestic
support for similar operations elsewhere that they are unlikely in the
future, "no matter how necessary or justified they might be."SO Polls seem
to bear this out. Even though the percentage of Americans who think
the United States can win the war in Iraq rose to 58 percent in August of
2008, the percentage opposing the war also rose to 60 percent-as did the
percentage who thought the United States made a mistake to send troops
to Iraq in the first place.Sl
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Is Imitation Flattery or ... ?

Perhaps the greatest endorsement of the efficacy of airpower in counterinsurgency operations might be expressed in the maxim, "Imitation is the
greatest form of flattery" Although airpower is seldom given much credit
by the ground forces, it appears to some observers that the army nevertheless
wants to build, in effect, its own air force.8 2 The armys acquisition of the Sky
Warrior, a virtual replica of the Air Forces Predator unmanned aerial system,
is but one piece of evidence among several that gives credence to this charge.83
Another more graphic indicator came in june of 2008. Thorn Shanker of
the New York Times reported that the army, charging the Air Force with irrelevance and an inability to meet its requests for "sophisticated surveillance
aircraft," was developing its own aviation unit.84 The Wall Street]oumallater
revealed that the "army is preparing to deploy a network of drones and other
surveillance aircraft to Afghanistan."85 All of this is a tacit admission by the
ground forces themselves that airpower has revolutionized counterinsurgency warfare, and that airpower is vastly more efficient and effective than
certain manpower-intensive infantry modalities of the past.
At the same time, there is little to suggest that ground forces understand
and employ airpower more productively than does the Air Force. Consider
that in Afghanistan, dubious army airpower planning for Operation
Anaconda would have produced a disaster had not air force fixed-wing
assets rescued the operation.86 Virtually the only conventional victory the
Iraqi military achieved in 2003, moreover, was the defeat of an army Apache
helicopter unit that left twenty-seven of thirty-three helicopters unable to
fly87 Also telling, as Major Robert]. Seifert points out in a joint Forces
Quarterly article, is how inefficiently ground commanders in Iraq used
the AC-130 gunships; indeed, their strategy was disturbingly reminiscent of
one that proved so ineffective in North Africa during World War n.ss The
commanders limited the aircraft to providing air cover to specific units, and
this made the gunships unavailable to attack emerging targets in another
units area of operations. They failed to optimize each sortie by refusing to
link the "on call" aircraft to several units, thus making it unable to respond
to the one with the greatest need.89
All of this makes some of the official writings of senior army officers
quite curious. Army lieutenant general Michael Vane asserts in Defense
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News that only soldiers at the "lowest echelon" (and not, he supposes, those
at "25,000 feet or 10 miles off-shore") can "find, capture, and if necessary,
kill" todays "religious extremists and nonstate actors. "90 Thus he claims
that land power "needs more of [the] budget pie" than the other services.
In another article, however, then-Lieutenant General Raymond T. Odierno
claims that aerial intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (as opposed
to soldiers at the "lowest echelon") are essential for todays counterinsurgency operations-and that these should be under a ground force
commanders control.9l
In any event, it seems clear that airpower has, rather unexpectedly;
emerged as the capability of choice for the counterinsurgency fight. One need
look no further than the fact that intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets were General Petraeuss "top hardware priority in Iraq."92 Would
it be efficient to give additional aerial platforms to the army officers who complain that the Air Force is not filling enough of their requests for surveillance
aircraft? Not likely Because the Air Force conducts "split operations"employing pilots in the United States to control large numbers of forwarddeployed unmanned aircaft-it is able to keep 88 percent of these unmanned
planes operational.93 The army; however, can organize itself to deploy only
about 30 percent of its unmanned aerial assets at any given time. 94
In truth, joint warfare is most powerful when individual services focus
upon their core competencies. In a world where thousands of airmen are filling army billets because of shortages in ground force personnel, it makes
no sense for a service to try to replicate the special capabilities of another
service. Such duplication is not just unnecessarily costly; it also detracts from
the combat power that interdependence might otherwise provide. Moreover,
viewing the allocation of scarce resources as a scramble for slices of the "budget pie" is profoundly unhelpful in preparing to meet the challenges of twenty-first-century conflicts.

The Future

Despite the Air Forces current difficulties, the future of the service is bright
if for no other reason than that airpower itself has demonstrated extraordinary flexibility and utility across the spectrum of conflict. The recent
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innovative and decisive applications of range airpower platforms in
counterinsurgency settings are powerful indicators of the resilience of this
central feature of the air weapon. That said, there is no doubt that the Air
Force has much work to do if it is to become-and to be perceived as-a
more effective and respected member of the joint team.
At the fall 2008 meeting of the Air Force Association, General Norton
Schwartz, Air Force chief of staff, alluded to an important principle seemingly overlooked by too many of todays strategists-that is, that technology
can allow the aerial warfighter to be far from the fight and still be essential
to mission success. General Schwartz insisted, 'The value of an Airmans
contribution is not measured by his or her proximity to the target. ... In fact,
without [the airmens] expertise, no one would be near the target."95 General
Schwartz$ point is that, notwithstanding the emotion the close fight may
engender, the purpose of using force is to achieve certain effects, and to do
so with the least risk to human beings. Airpower carries the most potential
to achieve desired effects with the lowest risk.The real value of a military
component is not its relative popularity in the body politic, but rather in its
ability to deliver the intended results for the society it serves. Technology
facilitates that end. Although many disparage the utility of high-technology
weaponry, Americans need to appreciate that technology is, in fact, this
countrys asymmetric advantage. Recently, strategic theorist Colin Gray
noted that "high technology is the American way in warfare. It has to be. A
high technology society cannot possibly prepare for, or attempt to fight, its
wars in any other than a technology-led manner."96
Overall, the "American way in warfare" has been the most successful in history In a real way, the technology-intensive nature of airpower makes it eminently "American." To the extent it is abandoned or demeaned, the United
States risks departing from a military approach that has the most promise to
provide options to decision makers that, among other things, do not require
placing masses of young Americans in harms way At the same time, air force
leaders must be able to assist decision makers in their understanding of the military arts, as well as the science of weaponry To do so effectively, they must comprehend fully, and be able to speak coherently about, the political, social, and
economic contexts of twenty-first-century conflicts. In this area, the air force has
much to learn from its sister services about how to produce leaders who areand who appear to be-ready to provide such comprehensive advice.
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It is imperative that the Air Force cultivate airmen-particularly at the
senior level-with a stronger ability to advocate airpower. Secretary Michael
Donley seemed to recognize this need when he observed that
we need to be prepared to engage-and if necessary debate-the
major issues facing our Air Force. Good stewardship demands
developing a deep understanding of the macro-level trends affecting the Air Force .... As we do so, we will cultivate reasoned, carefully considered perspectives. We will be able to present these
views not by digging in or staking out turf, but from a careful
analysis and a seasoned appreciation of the many joint and
national influences affecting today$ strategic decision-making.97
In order to meet its challenges, the Air Force must be prepared to
change those aspects of its culture that conflict with its large goals. It must
also explore new means of reconciling the burdens of a highly demanding
technical environment with the complex dynamics of human interactions,
the mastery of which is proving so essential to success in twenty-firstcentury warfare .
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